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Abstract 
The Ohio State EcoCAR Mobility challenge is an intercollegiate team that 
designs, builds, and tests a hybrid electric vehicle. One of the main goals of this team is 
to build a hybrid supervisory controls strategy that tests the potential failure mechanisms 
derived from fault analysis. Currently, Automotive companies are focused on integrating 
model-based designs enabling simulations for low-cost, rapid experimentation that assess 
a vehicle’s performance.  Model-based designs allow engineers to simulate specific tests 
within controlled environmental conditions. Through the use of model-based design, 
engineers can test vehicle and component faults inside a simulation model to assess how 
the vehicle behaves during various failures without incurring the cost of destructive 
testing. 
This thesis, in partner with the EcoCAR Mobility Challenge, aims to incorporate 
modern industrial fault diagnostics into a hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) simulation and 
analyze the performance of the model-based design. Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) and 
Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) were used to develop the necessary 
requirements for the vehicle system.  Different faults were intended to be tested for each 
major component, including, but not limited to, the energy storage system (ESS), rear 
electric motor, belted alternator starter, DC-DC converter, and the multiplexed vehicle 
electrical center. The ESS was the only component demonstrated as an example for 
integrating the fault insertion method. The research details how a standard method was 
constructed for developing and inserting faults in the HIL test environment. The process 
is used for testing and designing the control algorithm for a hybrid supervisor controller. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
The design of a vehicle’s hybrid supervisory controller is a difficult task that must be 
separated into multiple subsections. This thesis is developed to go into detail about 
testing the fault insertion subsections for designing the controller. Testing faults with the 
vehicle’s controller is an essential way to ensure that the controller is designed to be 
robust and handle different fault scenarios. In order to not damage the controller and 
safely run the execution of inserting multiple different fault scenarios the testing was 
conducted inside Hardware-in-the-Loop (HIL) simulation. HIL simulation allows for the 
controller to act as if installed on the vehicle and transmit different electrical signals via 
CAN communication. The usage of different HIL software allows the user to track the 
communication and check that the controller is designed to pass each developed 
requirement. The user can then send a faulty signal through the software and track that 
the controller behaves according to design.  
1.1. Motivation 
The automotive industry is spending large sums of money on testing and 
destroying multiple prototype vehicles. Companies are currently looking towards 
simulation techniques that can reduce the number of prototypes that are being destroyed 
or damaged from testing different fault cases. This research aims to provide a method for 
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conducting fault insertion with a simulation technique that both aids in the development 
and design of a controller in a safe and non-damaging way.  
1.2. EcoCAR Mobility Challenge 
The research is conducted in partnership with the Ohio State EcoCAR Mobility 
Challenge Team. The team constructs a four-year build cycle of taking apart a stock 
General Motors vehicle – this time it’s a 2019 Chevy Blazer – and modifying the vehicle 
to become a hybrid electric automobile. The research is specifically working with the 
propulsion controls and modeling sub team that is conducted at the Center for 
Automotive Research. During this thesis the team will be finishing year two and it is 
important to demonstrated proper testing with designing the team’s controller, the 
MicroAutoBox (MABx).  
1.3. Thesis Structure 
The thesis is broken up into six chapters and a short description of each chapter is as 
follows: 
• Chapter 1: Introduction, briefly discusses what the research is about, the 
motivation behind conducting the research, and the partnership support for 
guiding the research 
• Chapter 2: Background, goes over literature on different research that has been 
conducted on the similar matters regarding fault diagnostics, HIL simulation, and 
model-based design.  
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• Chapter 3: Methodology, takes what was learned from Chapter 2 and transitions 
to how that information was used within the thesis. 
• Chapter 4: Implementations, covers the different software used for testing and 
inserting a fault into the team’s controller 
• Chapter 5: Results, provides evidence that the research was a success and that the 
fault was adequately inserted into the controller and verified with the comparison 
of another simulation technique 
• Chapter 6: Conclusion, reiterates on what was covered in the course of the thesis 
and provides additional future work to be continued on the topic. 
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Chapter 2. Background 
For every professional automotive company, process is important to follow; this 
ensures that the development of a system is fully defined and working as intended. The 
industry follows a standard V-diagram, shown in Figure 1, as a guide stone for 
developing a sequence of events to take place for the entire design of a product [1]. 
Everything starts from the top left of the diagram, the high-level product requirement, 
and is designed downwards into more component specific. High-level requirements are 
intended for brainstorming and building a functional base to guide the project along. 
Requirements will be continually updated as the design process continues, and the 
development of requirements will be highlighted in the following section. Each block is 
separated by having a deliverable/task to complete before moving on to the next block. 
The V-diagram is split into two section: the left side for system/model design and the 
right side for verification and validation [2]. The diagram is structured to become more 
component specific (low level) when working downwards from top to bottom while the 
top of the diagram is for the high-level systems. 
Since this thesis is primarily about integrating a hybrid supervisor microcontroller 
into a vehicle we will only focus on a few necessary aspects of the V-diagram shown. 
Requirements will be analyzed by two different fault analyses methods, 
Development/Prototyping will be touch on with the integration of software-in-the-loop, 
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Testing & Tuning block will be addressed thoroughly with the integration of fault within 
hardware-in-the-loop simulation, and the additional system and field testing blocks will 
be cover briefly by component-in-the-loop and vehicle-in-the-loop simulations. 
 
 
Figure 1 Industry Fault Diagnostic V-Diagram 
 
2.1. Requirements Development/Fault Diagnostics 
The immediate process for any good design is the development of proper 
requirements: “In industry, 40% of budget is spent on rework; of that 70-85% of the 
rework is due to errors in requirements” [3]. The high expense and risk with making 
improper requirements makes this section a vital portion of including proper 
requirements into the research project for fault insertion and fault diagnostics.  
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Fault Diagnostics are used worldwide for research and design. The goal for fault 
diagnostics is to understand faults, defined as “unpermitted deviations of a feature in a 
system from the acceptable, usual, or standard conditions”, in order to prevent or 
minimize failures from occurring. The classification for a failure is a “permanent 
interruptions of a system’s ability to perform a required function under specified 
operating conditions” [1]. Developing proper requirements aids in the analysis of a 
system’s failure and to create those requirement, two common industrial methods were 
used: Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) and Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA).  
2.1.1. Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) 
Fault Tree Analysis is an approach to understanding the causes of already known 
failures by breaking up the failure into smaller component specific faults. Fault Tree 
Analysis (FTA) is a top down approach that begins with the failure of a system and 
determines the possible causes for the components basic failures which include logic 
operations, Figure 2 [1]. FTA is a useful tool for decision making and has multiple 
purposes including: understanding the logic leading to the top event, prioritizing 
contributors to the top event, preventing the top event from occurring, monitoring the 
performance of the system, minimizing and optimizing resources, assisting in the design 
of a system, and diagnosing causes of the top event. [4]  Only three of those conditions 
were utilized in the Fault Tree Analysis for this paper; understanding the logic leading to 
the top event, assisting in the design of a system, and diagnosing causes of the top event. 
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Figure 2 Fault Tree Analysis Block Diagram 
 
In order to conduct an FTA the following list must be followed in order [4]: 
1. Identify the objective for the FTA.  
2. Define the top event of the FTA. 
3. Define the scope of the FTA.  
4. Define the resolution of the FTA.  
5. Define ground rules for the FTA.  
6. Construct the FTA.  
7. Evaluate the FTA.  
8. Interpret and present the results.  
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Each step is essential for properly guiding the construction of a fault tree, and its main 
function is to have the analysis remain useful for the intended purpose. Steps 1-5 are prior 
to the construction of the actual fault tree (see Figure 2 for an example) and are important 
for setting up the guidelines in order to efficiently produce an analysis that is both helpful 
and logical for constructing requirements in the future. The scope defines which failures 
and contributions will be involve with the analysis, and the resolution is the planned 
amount of detail for breaking up the fault tree [4] hence these two steps can be thought of 
as going together. The ground rules provide the symbolic meaning of each gate/block. 
Figure 29, in Appendix B, shows the rules in which these blocks were constructed for this 
thesis. Step 6 and 7 are the visuals and construction of the analysis itself that breakup the 
common whole level failure into smaller component level faults. Step 8 takes the 
information from conducting the analysis and uses it to produce, the next sequential 
method, Failure Mode and Effects Analysis. 
2.1.2. Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) 
After completing the FTA, a failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) is 
performed to further understand the faults derived from the previous analysis. From 
Fords FMEA handbook, a FMEA is intended to “recognize and evaluate potential failures 
and its effects, and identify actions that could eliminate/reduce the failure from occurring 
while documenting the process” [5]. FMEA can be typically combined with FTA because 
the derived failure results from the FMEA can be incorporated into the FTA and vice 
versa. [1]. A constant loop can occur from these two methods by taking the faults from 
the FTA, using them in a FMEA to further understanding the faults, and use the in-depth 
9 
 
FMEA results as inputs for a new FTA. Continuing the loop until satisfied with the 
results/or have enough knowledge to complete the objective of the analysis, Figure 3. 
 
 
Figure 3 Requirement Development Flow chart  
 
The FMEA involves filling out a form that gives specific details regarding the 
components of interest. Table 1 shows the structure of the form, where the bold words are 
from the form and the rest of the box is an example for the structure. There can be 
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multiple functions for a specific item and each function can break down further with 
multiple potential failure modes and multiple potential effects. The first column instructs 
listing a function which must be measurable, similarly to a requirement [5]. The second 
column consists of failure modes which can fall into four categories: No function, partial 
function (degradation over time), intermittent function (“loses functionality due to 
external factors”), and unintended function. Columns 3 and 5 specifically draw out 
different effects and causes related with the failure. Columns 6, 8, and 11 relate with 
ways to avoid/reduce the failure from occurring and a “recommended action” of 
improving the design with the results to “reduce risk and increase customer satisfaction” 
[5]. 
 
Table 1: FMEA Form Structure 
Item / 
Func 
Pot. 
Failure 
Mode 
Pot. 
Effects 
S 
e 
v 
Pot. 
Causes 
Prevention 
Controls 
O 
c
c 
Detection 
Controls 
D 
e 
t 
R 
P 
N 
Rec. 
Action 
Item1/
Fnc1 
Fail1 … # Cause … # … # # … 
Fail2 … # Cause … # … # # … 
 
Item1/
Fnc2 
 
Fail1 
… # Cause … #  
… 
 
# 
#  
… … # Cause … # # 
 
Fail2 
… #  
Cause 
… #  
… 
 
# 
# … 
… # … # # … 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
 
Every failure mode has an associated Risk Priority Number (RPN) to quickly 
show which item needs to be prioritize during the design and validation phase. The RPN 
is a number from 0 to 1000 that showcases the importance of the potential effects by 
multiplying the severity rank, occurrence rank, and detection rank together. Each effect 
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has a specific severity rank and occurrence rank and each detection control has a specific 
detection rank (all ranks are from zero to ten). There are common industry rankings for 
each section that can be found in Appendix C: Table 2, Table 3, and Table 4, but it is 
recommended to develop and produce a separate internal ranking system to clearly 
prioritize the failures associated with the system. 
2.2. Model Based Design  
Model based design is commonly used amongst automotive industries and automotive 
related design projects. Past research articles have involved integrating and testing faults 
within components from cyber-physical systems such as electronic control units (ECUs) 
to investigating faults within a component specific system such as a hybrid electric 
vehicle inverter [6] [7] [8]. All model-based designs have the process of using X-in-the-
Loop, where ‘X’ refers to any testing environment which can be model, software, or 
hardware [9]. X-in-the-Loop (XIL) systems are useful for developing the testing 
environment for a system in initial/early design phases, represented as high-fidelity 
models, to inserting electrical faults within the specific physical hardware. The three 
primary systems are Model-in-the-Loop (MIL), Software-in-the-Loop (SIL), and 
Hardware-in-the-Loop (HIL). XIL allows for the slow and easy transition of testing a 
component to be incorporated into the entire system. Each XIL has different benefits and 
shortcoming that are addressed in the following sections. Chapter 3, Section 3.3 will 
showcase an example for using the different XIL systems in order to slowly incorporate 
the design of the vehicle’s controller.  
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2.2.1. Model-in-the-Loop (MIL) 
Model-in-the-Loop (MIL) is a simulation environment, solely on a computer’s 
software, that represents the component and/or system behavior. These models consist of 
no wires or physical connection, but are all internal to the software on the computer, 
which can be MATLAB/Simulink, ASCET [9], or ASM [6]. A MIL environment is 
decided with a use case in mind. A use case could be to quickly design the internal ECU 
of the physical component and test its interaction with a modeled plant environment, all 
without physically hooking up any hardware. Another use case example would be to 
represent high fidelity dynamics of an engine. The plant is typically developed separately 
from the controller and validated from previous physical testing. The shortcomings of a 
MIL environment are that it’s not a perfect representation of the real-world environment. 
Often, as there is an increased model fidelity, simulation time of the model must be taken 
into consideration. Simulation time can be a benefit if it’s faster than real time or a 
hinderance if the simulation requires heavy computation. For model-based design, MIL is 
often used as a baseline for calibrating parameters and quickly testing conceptional 
algorithms in appropriate fidelity environment. 
2.2.2. Software-in-the-Loop (SIL) 
SIL is the next logical step in the XIL process. SIL is the in-between stage from 
MIL and HIL simulation and is used to simulate the combination of internal software 
tools (such as Simulink [9]) and the c code (compiled code) for the designed hardware. C 
code is the modeled data of the component, written in the coding language C, that is used 
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to be flashed into the physical hardware being designed and developed. The primary 
purpose of SIL is to verify that the c code is constructed correctly and that the model runs 
properly before flashing the code into the hardware. If the c code is not being personally 
written and is instead compiled from built in software, like Simulink, then SIL can be 
skipped [8, 10]. 
2.2.3. Hardware-in-the-Loop (HIL) 
HIL is the final step of the XIL process. HIL is running the physical hardware, hence 
the name, in conjunction with a HIL simulator, such as dSPACE [10] or TTEthernet [8]. 
A HIL simulator acts as the plant and communicates with the component’s ECU via 
electrical communications. The simulator can be thought as tricking the ECU to believe it 
is in an actual vehicle. The user is allowed to adjust what messages and signals are being 
communicated from the simulator and test whether the ECU is properly responding to 
those signals. HIL allows for design engineers to test and send faults within the designed 
hardware without having to produce the fault case in the actual system. This produces a 
safe and efficient testing method, that could otherwise be harmful to the component 
and/or operator. 
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Chapter 3. Methodology 
Before beginning to insert a fault into the model, it is important to first build a strong 
foundation and understand what faults are to be delivered and tested. For guidance on 
how the work was conducted for this thesis, Figure 4 shows a V-diagram specifically for 
the fault diagnostic development. The V-diagram is conducted identically to a standard 
V-diagram, starting at the top left (high level) and working to the right and downwards 
(more component specific, low level) and back up again. Following the current industry 
test procedure, it is important to first start with the development of requirements, as 
highlighted in Chapter 2. Requirements are developed from the first three blocks using 
FTA and FMEA, and then work up the V-diagram by verifying each level of 
requirements.  
 
 
Figure 4 Research Specific V-Diagram 
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Going back up the V-diagram are four specific In-the-loop systems; Model-in-the-
Loop (MIL), Hardware-in-the-Loop (HIL), Component-in-the-Loop (CIL), and Vehicle-
in-the-Loop (VIL). The development and design of the MIL environment is done in 
parallel with the development and incorporation of requirements. The MIL model is 
structured to incorporate components and their interaction with the hybrid supervisor 
controller inside a simulation. HIL will be the primary focus of this thesis and takes the 
developed faults and physically tests those faults with the controller via electrical 
connections. CIL and VIL are an additional check for validating the design of the 
controller by testing the controller’s interaction with other physical components in a safe 
environment. All In-the-Loop systems will be discussed in more detail further in this 
Chapter, Section 3.3.  
3.1. Vehicle Architecture 
Before building requirements for the design of the vehicle’s main controller, 
dSPACE MicroAutoBox (MABx), it is important to lay out the components the controller 
will be interacting with in the vehicle. Laying out and understanding the structure of the 
system, and its associated components, allows visualization of the system to help with the 
development of potential failures or faults that could occur. Figure 5 shows OSU 
EcoCAR vehicle architecture, while Figure 6 highlights the controller/component 
interaction within the vehicle. 
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Figure 5 OSU EcoCAR Vehicle Architecture 
 
 
Figure 6 Vehicle Component Interaction Diagram 
 
It is not only important to understand issues with communication from the 
controller to the vehicle’s subcomponent ECUs, but to also address issues with how the 
ECUs interact with their physical component. This may seem as an obvious statement to 
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make but it is still addressed in this thesis because it can be a simple concept to overlook. 
Understanding the interaction with the subcomponent ECUs and their physical 
subsystem, ensures that during the requirement development phase that physical 
implementations of the controller are not overlooked.  
Take for example the requirement developed from the interface between the 
MABx and the Electric Machine Inverter, Figure 6. If the physical Electrical Machine, 
the motor, was not considered while developing the requirements then this would leave 
for a flawed design and potentially cause the motor to do harm to the vehicle, the person 
driving, or damage the component. The process can continually break down further, 
going as far as to incorporate the bolts inside the motor, but clearly this would be outside 
the scope of the development for the MABx controller, hence it is ignored. 
3.2. Requirement Development 
The next step after developing the vehicle’s architecture and subsystem 
interaction is to use this information to develop requirements. Requirements are an 
ongoing process that are continually being updated and modified as engineers learn more 
about their system. There are multiple tools to aid in the process of developing 
requirements but for this thesis two primarily tools were used: Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) 
and Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA). Additionally, requirements were 
produced and stored inside a requirements trackability matrix (RTM), which is 
continuously updated from the entire EcoCAR team. This central location allows all team 
engineers to know the software, hardware, and system requirements. 
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3.2.1. Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) 
Fault Tree Analysis is an industry wide method for constructing a visual 
representation that aids in the development of requirements. FTA can be thought of going 
one step further from the vehicle architecture, since an FTA shows what component are 
the cause of a higher-level system failure. As described in Chapter 2, the FTA starts from 
the top level and works downward into more specific circumstances or lower level 
subsystems/components. Before constructing an FTA analysis, it is important to first 
identify the objective for the analysis. The objective helps keep the analysis on track and 
prevents unnecessary bombardment of unrelated information, allowing the FTA to be an 
efficient use of time. The objective for every FTA conducted for this thesis was to gain a 
more general understanding of components and their interactions with the vehicle 
controllers, component controllers, and hybrid supervisory controller. 
The second step, defining the top event/failure, typically comes from experience. 
Fortunately, since EcoCAR has a partnership with General Motors (GM), GM provided a 
list of common top-level automotive industry faults. The list was the following: 
• Inadequate/delayed loss of vehicle deceleration including malfunction within the 
regen braking system. 
• Unintended acceleration 
• Unintended longitudinal motion; unintended vehicle motion (rollaway) 
• Unintended travel in the wrong direction, unintended propulsion flow 
• Unintended or loss of lateral motion (includes locked steering) 
• Unintended deceleration 
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• Loss or degradation of acceleration; loss or degradation of propulsion (e.g., stall) 
• Unintended release of thermal energy causing burns or fire 
• Unintended exposure to high voltage energy system (shock) 
• Unintended exposure to toxic / flammable chemicals (gas/liquid) 
• Unintended access to rotating or moving components (e.g., engine start) 
The final steps to be conducted before actually constructing the fault tree include 
defining the scope, resolution, and ground rules. The scope and resolution limited the 
fault tree to the components shown in Figure 6. The ground rules included using only the 
standard block schematics found in Appendix B: Figure 29.  
The next step in the process is to physically construct the fault tree diagram. The 
diagram in constructed by taking a common fault and using that as the starting point for 
the fault tree. Figure 7 shows an example of an FTA for a vehicle deceleration failure. 
This is a high level “common” fault from the GM provided categorized failure list. 
 The common fault, in red, is always addressed first and broken down to more 
specific components, in orange. The FTA has three color coding: red, orange, and blue. 
Red represents the highest-level event, orange indicates additional lower lever events will 
follow, and blue represents the lowest level event for that analysis. Each block can 
typically be considered as either an AND gate or an OR gate. An AND gate means that 
all the following events must occur for the higher event to take place, and an OR gate 
means that if any of the following events occur then the higher event will take place. The 
event is shown to be a OR gate by a circular arc underneath the event block; an AND gate 
would have a straight line. Since, the blue events are the lowest level, they do not 
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associate with being an AND or OR gate. For a better understanding of the block and 
color identification see Appendix B. 
 
 
Figure 7: Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) for a Deceleration Failure 
 
The FTA shows the different component level issues that are associated with the 
full vehicle system failure. The FTA example showed that when designing the controller 
and considering faults with improper vehicle deceleration, it is important to test electrical 
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faults from the 12V battery supply, motor, inverter, CAN bus, LV Harness, and Energy 
Storage System (ESS). Hence the FTA provided a list of components for developing the 
fault requirements associated with a full-level vehicle braking failure. 
3.2.2. Failure Mode and Effects Analysis 
The Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) takes what was learned from the 
FTA and breaks it down further. Continuing with the deceleration failure example, an 
FMEA guides the user to incorporate these specific component failures from the FTA 
into the FMEA document for further, more detailed, review. Figure 8 shows the filled out 
FMEA document from the conducted FTA. The first column is filled out with each 
component, derived from the FTA, and the function for that component is broken up as a 
high-level function since the analysis was conducted for a high-level system. Since the 
functions are high-level, the standard for making measurable functions had to be 
overlook for this analysis. Each column was filled out according to the potential failure 
(typically shown from FTA), potential causes of failure, and prevention and detection 
controls. Each situation was raked accordingly from the EMC rankings, found in 
Appendix C: Table 5-Table 7, that were specifically created for this FMEA.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
Figure 8 FMEA from FTA Deceleration Failure 
  
2
2
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The RPN provides which component and failure needs to be prioritize during 
testing. The ESS came on top with an RPN of 210 and was further looking into detail for 
deriving a test case. The recommendation for preventing the main ESS failure was for the 
controller to remove any current being sent to the ESS when receiving an ESS fault. The 
recommendation guided the team for developing the following requirement: 
 
“The absolute value of the ESS current shall not be less than 5 Amps within 5 seconds of 
an ESS fault detection”. 
 
The requirement will be used to create a test case for when the controller is tested inside 
the HIL simulation rack, the full example of this test case will cover in Chapter 4. The 
additional recommendations from the FMEA allowed for the development of additional 
requirements to be stored inside the RTM.  
 
3.3. In-the-Loop System 
In-the-Loop systems are commonly used when conducting a model-based design. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, these In-the-Loop systems are known as Model-in-the-Loop 
(MIL), Software-in-the-Loop (SIL), and Hardware-in-the-Loop (HIL). EcoCAR 
additionally adds two In-the-Loop systems; Component-in-the-Loop (CIL) and Vehicle-
in-the-Loop (VIL). Though, all these In-the-Loop systems will be touched on in this 
section, it is important to point out that HIL will be highly covered since HIL is the 
primary method incorporated with this research. 
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3.3.1. Model-in-the-Loop (MIL) 
Model-in-the-Loop is a way to model the entire vehicle via a simulation. The 
model is developed from MathWorks’s software, Simulink, to incorporates the full 
vehicle model. This full vehicle model simulates all major powertrain components for 
various drive cycles. MIL is used to develop the logic for tested failures by sending 
error/warning signals to the controller model and verifying its controller response. The 
MIL model is shown in Figure 9 where it clearly shows the Plant (the simulated vehicle), 
the driver model, and the vehicle’s controller. SIL is overlooked for the transition from 
MIL to HIL because Simulink provides a built-in c-code compiler, which makes SIL 
unnecessary.   
 
 
Figure 9: EcoCAR’s Model-in-the-Loop Simulink Model 
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3.3.2. Hardware-in-the-Loop (HIL) 
Unlike MIL, HIL goes one step further by physically testing and checking the 
communication from the plant to the controller. The design of the hybrid supervisory 
controller known as the dSPACE MABx can then be tested to ensure in real time that the 
signals being transmitted are as expected. The MABx is connected to a dSPACE mid-size 
HIL simulator by physical connections. The dSPACE mid-size HIL simulator 
incorporates a licensed program, ControlDesk, which enables tracking serial 
communication in real time. An example and more information about ControlDesk will 
be covered in Chapter 4. 
The Simulink model, Figure 9, allows for a quick transition from MIL to HIL by 
double clicking and changing the testing environment mask. The transition keeps the 
MIL based model algorithm for both the plant and the controller, and only changes the 
input and output layers. Quick validation for MIL and HIL is able to be conducted since 
both the MIL and HIL models have the same base algorithm. The input and output layers 
change the communication from virtual to electrical, when transitioning over to HIL. The 
HIL input and output layers incorporate CAN communication, enabling multiple signals 
and messages to be sent through the bus.  
The HIL structure allows for sending a failure/error message to the controller 
from the modelled plant and checks that during a simulated drive cycle the controller acts 
as expected. The developed requirements, stored in the RTM, are used to check and 
validate that the controller passed the requirement from receiving the fault message. The 
process is continued to check the controller satisfies each requirement.  
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3.3.3. Component-in-the-Loop (CIL) and Vehicle-in-the-Loop (VIL) 
CIL and VIL are additional X-in-the-Loop systems that are essential to conduct 
prior to the release of the designed vehicle. Both systems ensure that all components 
interact with one another as intended by integrating the physical components together. 
The components are typically integrated into the vehicle and tested for functionality and 
the vehicle’s performance. Since both of these systems consist of physical interaction and 
not solely electrical, like HIL, a replication of testing component failure would cause 
hardware damage, hence fault insertion would not be wise for these methods. These 
systems are addressed in this thesis for completion and to provide further information 
regarding additional X-in-the-Loop systems that are to be conducted before the release of 
the designed controller. 
CIL takes either a specific component or a portion of the entire full-vehicle 
system and tests for functionality as well as how the subsystem components interact with 
one another. The subsystem can be tested on a dynamometer by disconnecting part of the 
full-vehicle system and only using the installed section. Figure 10 showed testing the 
engine/ transmission subsystem in the vehicle without having the rear electric motor 
incorporated. 
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Figure 10: OSU EcoCAR Engine Component in the Loop Testing 
 
VIL, one step further than CIL, consists of testing the entire vehicle with all the 
physical components installed on the vehicle. The vehicle can be tested either at a testing 
facility like TRC or on an AWD dynamometer. This is the final step of ensuring the 
components function safely and properly before releasing to the public. 
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Chapter 4. Implementations 
In order to test that a fault is being transmitted, it is necessary to ensure that the 
controller both reads either a warning/error or fault message and responds with an 
appropriate control action. This process needs to be adequately documented and done in 
real time to track that the response rate set from requirements are satisfied. There are 
primarily three software interfaces that are used for this research, MATLAB/Simulink, 
dSPACE ControlDesk and dSPACE AutomationDesk. dSPACE Synect, a test 
management software, was originally planned to be added to these software toolboxes, 
but due to unexpected circumstances this software wasn’t able to be incorporated.  
This Chapter’s main focus will be on the different software that were incorporated 
into this thesis. To aid in the understanding of the different software, a fault pertaining to 
the ESS will be inserted and tested. The ESS was chosen first because it is rated as a 
high-risk component that additionally lacks proper testing and was rated high from the 
FMEA conducted in Chapter 3. The requirement to be tested for the ESS was framed as 
follows:  
 
“The absolute value of the ESS current shall not be less than 5 Amps within 5 seconds of 
an ESS fault detection”. 
 
All other requirements are stored inside the requirement traceability matrix (RTM) and 
the RTM is used to check that all requirements related with controller communication are 
satisfied. 
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4.1. Simulink 
Simulink, developed and produced by MathWorks, is a simulation software 
toolbox that allows for the construction of a model that can be ran and tested. Simulink is 
used for the construction of the full vehicle model MIL and HIL model. Chapter 3 goes 
into greater detail about MIL and HIL and how MIL is used specifically with Simulink. 
The HIL model, as described in Chapter 3, takes the base algorithms from the MIL plant 
and controller and only changes the input and output (communication) algorithms. Figure 
11 helps to demonstrate this concept by highlighting and showing the HIL model layout 
from a portion of the Simulink Model. Boxed in red are the communication 
layers/algorithms that are internally changed when transitioning between the MIL & HIL 
environment, while the main internal controller, boxed in black, remains constant.   
 
 
Figure 11 Controller Layout from HIL Simulink Model 
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Simulink is then used to prepare the HIL model for testing and inserting faults. 
The HIL model signals are prepped by enabling global data export for the signals 
associated with either the plant’s warning or error CAN signals. Exporting data globally 
on these signals allows for ControlDesk to manipulate these signals, hence test that the 
controller both receives and responds according to the modified fault message.  
Continuing with the ESS fault case, the ESS error and warning Boolean messages 
are exported to enable modification in ControlDesk. This gives the user the ability to 
track in ControlDesk whether the ESS requirement is satisfied. Figure 12 shows the 
physical layout of various plant CAN signals that are being exported for ControlDesk 
manipulation. The signals that are enabled are indicated by being underlined in red and 
from the blue wireless output icon shown above the V_ESS_Warning_Bool_NA and 
V_ESS_Error_Bool_NA signals. The signals will additionally need to be exported 
globally for ControlDesk to manipulate and read these signals. 
 
 
Figure 12 Simulink Plant Output CAN signals – ESS Fault Enabling 
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The final step for Simulink is to compile the full vehicle model into compiled 
code (c-code). The plant and controller being two different reference models are 
compiled separately. The compiled controller model and the plant model c-codes are 
flashed into the controller and the HIL Simulator respectively. The HIL simulator acts as 
the plant for the controller and both systems are connected by electrical signals that 
communicate via CAN. CAN communication is created in the Simulink input and output 
algorithm blocks using the RTI CAN Multimessage block sets. The blocks sets are 
specifically developed to enable interface of dSPACE hardware products such as the 
MABx & HIL Simulator using MATLAB/Simulink. The RTI block set allows for quick 
CAN modifications and works in conjunction with the Simulink code compiler. 
4.2. ControlDesk 
ControlDesk is a software, made by dSPACE, that contains a user-friendly 
interface for tracking communication and signal values in real time. ControlDesk takes 
the compiled code generated by Simulink and flashes the C-codes for the controller and 
the plant onto their respective hardware. All specified signals can be tracked and 
modified during a run cycle, enabling ControlDesk to be a vital tool for checking 
communication, inserting a fault and diagnosing the system response. The triggered error 
or warning signal is sent from the HIL plant to the MABx and checks if the controller 
receives the signal and correctly responds, passing the requirement criteria. For 
organizing and simplifying the test procedure, three layouts were created: the dashboard, 
calibration window, and diagnostic layout. 
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4.2.1. The Dashboard Layout 
The dashboard layout is exactly what it sounds like: a representation of a 
vehicle’s dashboard during simulation. Figure 13 shows the active dashboard layout 
running a drive cycle. It was initially created to test a failure with the electric storage 
system (ESS). The far-left side, the SimState block, gives the tester the ability to stop, 
pause, and start the simulated drive cycle. The middle section shows signals, represented 
as a dashboard, being transmitted during the cycle and is used for a visual check that the 
signal values are updating correctly. The right side provides a user interface with 
togglable switches, for triggering different vehicles functions while additionally giving 
the user the ability to insert and test an ESS fault. Underneath the ESS fault block is a 
display showing the drive trace that visibly updates in real time. 
 
 
Figure 13 Dashboard Layout Running Drive Cycle 
 
The ESS fault is togglable in this layout and gives the user the ability to see how 
the vehicle response when the fault is active. Here the user can validate that the vehicle 
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performs as expected for as quick visual check. ControlDesk additionally records the 
different ESS current value and time stamp so the user can ensure that the requirement is 
being passed. 
4.2.2. Calibration Layout 
The calibration layout allows for physical alterations and calibrations to be made 
to the controller in real time. All calibration changes will not be permanently stored 
inside the controller but still aids in the design and development process. Figure 14 shows 
the calibration layout that was constructed for the MABx controller. The Calibration 
layout is not intended for physically testing faults, but still remains a useful tab for 
designing the controller and setting/changing different controller attributes. 
 
 
Figure 14 Calibration Layout for MABx Controller 
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4.2.3. Diagnostic Layout 
The diagnostic layout is used for troubleshooting issues and changing 
signal/variable values. The CAN bus is verified to communicating properly from this 
layout and additionally shows important specified messages according to their 
corresponding CAN bus. CAN communication is verified by visually checking that the 
RX/TX time is updating. The CAN communication fault can also be triggered by 
unchecking the Global Enable checkbox. Additional messages and signals can be added 
to this layout for troubleshooting. Figure 15 shows a general diagnostic layout with every 
CAN bus being updated and validated for that window.  
 
 
Figure 15 Generic Diagnostic Layout with CAN Communication Channels  
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The diagnostic tab can additionally be used for testing the ESS fault, similarly to 
the dashboard layout. The set up for the diagnostic tab is typically simpler than the 
dashboard layout hence making the diagnostic tab preferred when conducting quick 
requirement tests.  
4.3. Automation Desk 
AutomationDesk takes a list of conducted tests from ControlDesk and both 
collects and stores the results into a report format. The AutomationDesk code is designed 
and built to automate execution of test cases. These test cases are arranged in a hierarchy, 
with each test case being run through a sequence of blocks from top to bottom . The 
process is simply conducted by the click of a button and removes the need to manually 
initiate the execution of every test case. Since multiple components will have multiple 
requirements to be tested, AutomationDesk is essential for testing that all previous 
requirements are not affected while the controller is being designed to meet additional 
requirements. The automated test process can then be used to ensure that all past test 
cases remain valid during the development of the controller algorithm. 
The ESS fault example is continued to be used here to walkthrough the benefits of 
using AutomationDesk. The ESS fault was tested for three different cases to ensure that 
the requirement continued to be satisfied during all three cases. The three cases involved 
inserting the ESS fault during a braking, accelerating, and coasting scenarios. The 
EcoCAR mobility challenge (EMC) drive trace was used for the diagnosis of a fault in 
the three scenarios considered. Figure 16 highlights the different portions of the drive 
trace where the faults were inserted. After the faults were inserted, AutomationDesk 
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checked that the current value was below 5 Amps after 5 seconds and reported whether 
the requirement was a pass or failure. The current and time values were set by the 
requirement stated in the beginning of the Chapter. 
 
 
Figure 16 EMC Drive Trace w/ Highlighted ESS Fault Portions  
 
AutomationDesk uses a block format for developing the sequential code that is 
ran for the process. The higher-level blocks consisted of starting and opening 
ControlDesk, running the Data Acquisition, and performing the Data Analysis to be 
stored inside the report. Figure 17 provides the AutomationDesk interface that has the 
ESS fault cases as described earlier. The left side shows a list of variables and folders that 
are stored inside AutomationDesk for organization and for reporting and checking the 
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different variable values. The right side is the programable interface that is organized by 
three compressed blocks for running the code. 
 
 
Figure 17 AutomationDesk Layout w/ ESS Fault Scenarios 
 
Each block from the constructed code is separated primarily by its main task. The 
ControlDesk Start block simply opens and runs the ControlDesk model. The 
DataAcquisition block obtains the requested ControlDesk values and stores them in the 
variables. The DataAnalysis block checks that the requirement is satisfied with an if-else 
block for demonstrating if the criteria was a pass or fail, Figure 18. 
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The three test cases (fault during acceleration, braking, and coasting) are all 
identical except for the fault insertion time, which is modified inside the Data Acquisition 
Block, shown in Figure 19. Boxed in red is the error time variable for the when the fault 
test should start. The figure shows the value of 165 seconds which matches the 
acceleration time period from the EMC City Cycle, from Figure 16. Since all three test 
cases are primarily the same with slight modifications, this makes AutomationDesk a 
quick and easy tool for testing the different faults with the need to only make slight 
modifications. 
 
 
Figure 18 If-Else Block for Pass/Failure Criteria 
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Figure 19 DataAcquisition Block – Set Error Time Section 
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Chapter 5. Results 
The success for this research involved properly using the given software to construct 
a method for inserting a fault into HIL simulation. All previous Chapters went through 
the process of understanding and setting up of the software for the test cases, but the 
focus for this Chapter will be on the actual results obtained by the software. As discussed 
earlier the requirements set whether the test case passes or fails, which is internally stored 
inside the RTM. The RTM is an excel sheet of every requirement and test that has been 
conducted and verified, Figure 20.  
The documented report from the AutomationDesk script - for the ESS fault 
scenario - successfully presented the results of the test. The following figures, Figure 21-
Figure 26, show the reported graphs from the ESS fault scenarios; recall that these cases 
included inserting an ESS fault during an acceleration, braking, and coasting portion of 
the drive cycle. The current profile on each scenario was less than 5 Amperes within 5 
seconds, meeting the requirement. AutomationDesk additionally tested cases for the 
different component limits and the entire results of the test are stored at the end of the 
report, Figure 27. A failure in any of the test will require the user to reevaluate the design 
of the hybrid supervisory controller and ensure that all requirements are satisfied. 
  
 
 
 
Figure 20 RTM Excel Sheet
4
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Figure 21 Drive Trace: ESS Fault Insertion During Acceleration 
 
 
Figure 22 Current Trace: ESS Fault Insertion During Acceleration 
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Figure 23 Drive Trace: ESS Fault Insertion During Braking 
 
 
Figure 24 Current Trace: ESS Fault Insertion During Braking 
44 
 
Figure 25 Drive Trace: ESS Fault Insertion During Coasting 
 
 
Figure 26 Current Trace: ESS Fault Insertion During Coasting 
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Figure 27 Report Test Results  
 
Finally, the same test cases were implemented in the MIL environment and results 
were compared with the HIL results. This comparison helps to verify that the control 
logic is maintained across both the environments. Figure 28 shows the comparison of the 
MIL and HIL results. The similarities of each method following the same profile is a 
clear indication that that the HIL fault implementation was a success. 
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Figure 28 MIL vs HIL Simulation Comparison w/ an ESS Fault 
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Chapter 6. Conclusion 
The focus of this thesis was to develop a systematic procedure for using fault 
diagnostic tools to be incorporated in HIL. Standard industry fault diagnostic tools were 
used to help construct the requirements that set the foundation for creating multiple test 
cases for fault insertion. The faults were used to develop and design a robust and safe 
controller and HIL simulation was the prime environment in which the faults was 
inserted. HIL simulation allowed for the physical controller to act as if in a vehicle while 
additionally removing the unsafe aspect of physically testing faults with component 
integration. An ESS fault was successfully inserted into the HIL simulation and proper 
documentation of the process was covered.  
The main focus of this thesis was to demonstrate a professional way for using fault 
diagnostic tools to be incorporated into HIL software in order to design a vehicle 
controller. Standard industry fault diagnostic tools were used to help construct the 
requirements that set the foundation for creating multiple test cases for fault insertion. 
The faults were used to develop and design a robust and safe controller and HIL 
simulation was the prime In-the-Loop system to insert the fault. HIL simulation allowed 
for the physical controller to act as if inside a vehicle while additionally removing the 
unsafe aspect of physically testing faults with component integration. An ESS fault was 
successfully inserted into the HIL simulation and proper documentation of the process 
was covered.  
The fault diagnostic procedure covered in this thesis was developed by working 
towards the 2019 Winter Workshop Deliverable for the Ohio State EcoCAR Team. This 
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procedure was presented as a technical video and report which were reviewed by industry 
experts from GM, MathWorks and dSPACE and other competition sponsors. OSU 
received an outstanding near perfect score in this deliverable. OSU plans to expand this 
tool to encompass other propulsion components and perform fault diagnostics to ensure 
operation safety and controller robustness. The HIL procedure is developed to further 
improve upon automotive industries across the globe and familiarize both student and 
engineers on how X-in-the-Loop systems, specifically HIL, can support the work for 
designing and testing the development of a controller. The HIL environment additionally 
supports any component with electrical communications and can additionally be used for 
hardware integration and for lifecycle/endurance testing. 
6.1. Future Work 
The research will continue to integrate additional test cases while designing the 
controller. The requirements will be continually updated across the design phase, and 
more requirements will be added potentially all components that will need to be tested. 
With the increasing number of test cases, keeping track of impact of controller algorithm 
updates on meeting test requirements will become cumbersome. Therefore, the use of 
dSPACE Synect to manage test cases is recommended in future.  
Synect allows for multiple AutomationDesk tests to be compiled together. 
Automation Desk lacks the capability of tracking changes and different versions of the 
controller algorithm along with test case results. Fixing the AutomationDesk limitations, 
Synect can maintain an overall database to simultaneously track controller algorithm 
updates along with test case results. This will finally aid the fault diagnostics by 
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providing a better understanding of the effect of updated control strategy on controller 
robustness to faults.  
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 FTA: Key Block Diagrams 
 
Figure 29 FTA: Block KEY 
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 FMEA Rankings 
Note: All Industrial rankings charts (Table 2-Table 4) were grabbed from Ford’s FMEA 
2011 Handbook [5]. Table 5-Table 7 were used for the rankings in FMEA example in 
Chapter 3, Section 3.2.2. 
 
Table 2 Automotive Industrial Severity Rankings 
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Table 3 Automotive Industrial Occurrence Rankings 
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Table 4 Automotive Industrial Detection Rankings 
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The Following Rankings were used to construct the FMEA used for this Thesis in 
Chapter 3, Section 3.2.2. 
 
Table 5 EMC Severity Rankings 
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Table 6 EMC Occurrence Rankings 
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Table 7 EMC Detection Rankings 
 
 
 
